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1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis joins the dialogue in political philosophy about the potential necessity for
residential integration of poor urban Black people in the U.S. into whiter neighborhoods to
correct for injustices (historical and contemporary). Specifically, this thesis examines the
disagreement between Tommie Shelby and Elizabeth Anderson over whether residential
integration based on race is a requirement of justice. I contribute to their debate by grounding it
in the lived experience of Black people, as filtered through a racially sensitive phenomenological
framework. I do this by remembering and calling forth the voice of bell hooks, who was forced
to shoulder the cost of school integration efforts as a child. I use Sara Ahmed’s
phenomenological account of whiteness to illustrate that the costs of integration which bell
hooks faced decades ago remain relevant and have important implications for any contemporary
residential integration efforts.
In the first section, I lay out Anderson’s argument for seeing residential segregation as an
injustice and residential integration as an instance of corrective justice. I focus on her use of what
I call the “pragmatic model” as a framework of analysis and her examination of social capital as
a way in which residential segregation hurts poor Black people. The second section elaborates on
the alternative position Shelby develops in response to Anderson, highlighting his use of what he
calls a “systematic-injustice” framework to argue that justice does not demand residential
integration. The third section turns to how Shelby critiques Anderson based on the limitations of
her framework, and the way her argument on social capital can be seen as an example of the
susceptibility of her framework to being overly narrow. The section then considers how
Anderson might pushback against Shelby’s criticism. Motivated by Shelby’s critique of
Anderson and Anderson’s potential response to Shelby, the fourth section uses a
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phenomenological account of whiteness in conjunction with the actual experience of Black
people to help ground the integration debate, leading to a better understanding of the potential
costs and fallout of racial integration.
I proceed in this thesis from the fact that there are concentrated neighborhoods of poverty
that overlap with racial segregation/clustering and metropolitan spaces such that in the U.S. we
have what Shelby calls “dark ghettos”- places where most of the residents are Black and there
are concentrated disadvantages including severe poverty present (2016: 41)iii. Further, I assume
that the creation and sustaining of the material and social conditions of these ghettos result from
historically deep and numerous racist structures, practices, and institutions. Lastly, I narrow my
focus here to Shelby and Anderson’s arguments regarding race based residential integration and
leave aside related topics like solely economic driven integration efforts.
2

ANDERSON’S VIEW

Anderson argues that residential segregation along racial lines in the U.S. generates
Black-white inequality due in part to Black people losing out on the bridging social capital that
would advance their socioeconomic positions. Anderson diagnoses this inequality as an injustice,
and she advocates for race- based residential integration as a multi-faceted process that can help
eliminate the inequality residential segregation produces. Residential integration, for Anderson,
thus becomes a requirement of corrective justice. Subsection one will first explain how justice
and non-ideal theory are used as foundations for Anderson’s argument for integration. Then I
lay out Anderson’s arguments for conceiving of segregation as an injustice and integration as a
necessary solution to the injustice of segregation.
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2.1

Non-ideal theory and Justice
First, the way in which Anderson conceives of non-ideal political philosophy should be

established. Anderson compares non-ideal theory to the diagnosis and treatment a physician
might propose for a sick patient. As she says, “Nonideal theory begins with a diagnosis of the
problems and complaints in our society and investigates how to overcome these problems”
(2010: 6). This framework for non-ideal theory can be seen in Anderson’s reliance on empirical
data to diagnose and suggest treatments for racial segregation. Accordingly, she explains that her
incorporation of empirical data is an attempt to check her analysis and test the effectiveness of
her proposed solution (integration). I do not have space to go into the details of Anderson’s data
analysis, nor does the objection by Shelby that I emphasize turn on interpretations of empirical
data. Given this, I will leave aside questions about the soundness of Anderson’s empirical
conclusions, although intriguing work is being done to defend her data analysis.iii
We can move on to see how the idea of justice works in Anderson’s non-ideal approach
to racial segregation. Anderson sees racial integration as a necessary means for discharging the
duties of corrective justice. More precisely, for Anderson: “If segregation is a fundamental cause
of social inequality and undemocratic practices, then integration promotes greater equality and
democracy. Hence, it is an imperative of justice” (2010: 2). Later, she summarizes the role of
justice in reacting to the perceived injustice of racial segregation by saying that, “Since the
problem is an injustice, the remedy is an imperative of justice” (2010: 112). Importantly,
Anderson sees segregation as having a causal relation to the inequality Black people face in the
U.S. Segregation is not, for her, only the fallout of prevailing racist attitudes or constrained
residential options for Black people. Instead, as the following subsection will show, segregation
works to perpetuate and exacerbate unjust social inequality, according to Anderson.
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2.2

The Cost of Segregation
Anderson argues that segregation, “isolates disadvantaged groups from access to public

and private resources . . . depresses their ability to accumulate wealth . . . [and] reinforces
stigmatizing stereotypes about the disadvantaged and thus causes discrimination” (2010: 2).
Anderson identifies four kinds of ‘capital’ that are undermined by segregation. Capital here
refers to the assets or advantages that constitute one’s socioeconomic position as well as allow
for upward mobility in terms of socioeconomic status (2010: 31). The four kinds of capital
Anderson identifies are financial, social, human, and cultural. I will focus here on Anderson’s
arguments for social capital, as the objection by Shelby I highlight revolves around this aspect of
Anderson’s work.
Social capital for Anderson denotes the “networks of people in social relationships that
serve as resources for individual and collective action.” (2010: 33). Specifically, Anderson is
focused on the way that social capital works as a vehicle for information that is vital to
maintaining or elevating one’s socioeconomic position (2010:33). The flow of information about
career, educational, or healthcare related opportunities is a function of one’s social capital. Thus,
the networks of people an individual can rely on to receive and transmit information about
opportunities, like a specific job opening, are what constitute their social capital.
One way Anderson develops her account of social capital is by making distinctions
between bonding and bridging social capital. Bonding social capital refers to the assets one gains
by making social relations with someone who has a shared social identity, for instance, the
relation between two individuals who identify as country club members. Bridging social capital
refers to the advantages of social relations between people with different social identities, for
example, relations between people of different races who develop social bonds. Whether bonding
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or bridging, Anderson also distinguishes between strong and weak social ties. The ties of strong
social capital are characterized by the high levels of emotional intensity or time invested as well
as reciprocity (so that the social relationship is not one-sided). The ties of weak social capital
have identical characteristics to strong social bonds, but with lower levels of intensity (2010: 33).
In the case of racial segregation, Anderson is concerned by the weak bridging ties she
sees Black people as missing out on by being residentially segregated from whites. She argues
that segregation undermines Black people’s ability to form these weak ties with whites, ties that
could lead to job opportunities, better education, and other advantages. Anderson focuses on
weak social ties to illustrate that an important part of what is now demanded by corrective justice
is not as extreme as for Black people to be intimately connected to whites, but simply to have
access to assets that do not presuppose intimacy, such as word of mouth job opportunities. While
whites can do without these weak bridging ties due to historic and contemporary societal
advantages, Anderson argues that Black people need these ties to advance their socioeconomic
status.
Beyond the advantages of weak bridging social capital, Anderson believes that racial
segregation leads to weaker bonding ties among Black people. She points to empirically
observed low-levels of trust within Black communities: “Employed Black people are less likely
than whites to recommend their unemployed male relatives and friends for a job because they do
not trust them to do a good job” (2010: 34). I turn in the following subsection to Anderson’s
argument for how integration functions as a countermeasure to the injustice of race based
residential segregation.
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2.3

Intervening Through Integration
Anderson lays out four different stages through which integration efforts can be seen to

advance, while acknowledging that any integration will happen at different rates and with
different levels of resistance depending on the contexts. The four stages of integration she
identifies are: “(1) formal desegregation, (2) spatial integration, (3) formal social integration, (4)
informal social integration” (2010: 116). Anderson believes it is necessary to move through all
four stages to attain the full benefits of integration, as well as to fully correct for the injustice of
segregation. Along this line of thinking, Anderson argues that each of the above stages will offer
an increase in capital to Black people, but that reaching the final stage is necessary to develop the
weak bridging ties she has argued are needed. For example, in the U.S. we have seen de jure
segregation eliminated but this has not led to the social ties Anderson seeks.
There are a number of specific policies that, Anderson argues, have moved and will
continue to move integration through her four stages: “housing vouchers to promote black entry
into non-black middle class neighborhoods . . . adoption of integrative programs by school
districts . . .extension of discrimination-blocking and integrative affirmative action programs . .
.“ (2010: 189). While Anderson gives an empirical analysis that supports a number of integrative
policies led by the state, she recognizes that individual citizens will have a great deal of
responsibility for ensuring the success of such programs and also that any specific integrative
policy may need to be adapted to fit specific circumstances. In this way, Anderson offers a
defense of integration programs like Moving To Opportunity (MTO) and Gautreaux while
remaining open to adapting such programs or creating new ones as driven by their empirical
results.
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Anderson is clear that the spirit of this integration is not to be confused with
assimilation- she does not want only the disadvantaged social group (Black people) to change,
but whites as well. By pushing for residential integration as one essential element of the four
stages of integration mentioned above, Anderson believes that the current social dynamics of
whites dominating and alienating Black people can be overcome (2010: 117). One consequence
of Anderson’s argument is that for her proposed treatment to be viable, whites have to be ready
to tear down the social structures and patterns of thought which perpetuate their social
advantages by dehumanizing Black people.
This section has shown how Anderson utilizes justice and non-ideal theory to identify
residential segregation as an injustice and propose a correction for it in the form of integration.
Next, I will discuss Shelby’s alternative position on the issue of residential integration.
3

SHELBY’S VIEW

At the core of both Shelby’s and Anderson’s views is a framework of justice, based on
Rawlsian principles. The question of what the duty of justice demands guides much of their work
and arguments, even as they come to opposing conclusions. Both philosophers are explicit about
their use of non-ideal frameworks, however they approach non-ideal political philosophy
differently- Shelby rejects the pragmatic model that guides Anderson, and instead utilizes a
systemic-injustice framework. This section examines the role of Rawlsian ideas about justice in
Shelby’s argument, in order to show how his conception of the duty of justice leads him to reject
the integrationist position.
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3.1

Systemic-Injustice Framework and the Demands of Justice
Shelby’s project is to address the issue of what oppressed, marginalized, and

disadvantaged populations of Black peoples in the U.S. owe to society and the state and vice
versa. He begins by rejecting what he calls the “medical model”, which I have dubbed the
“pragmatic model”, for addressing these issues. The pragmatic model aims “to increase the
material welfare of people living in ghettos through narrowly targeted and empirically grounded
interventions into their lives” (2016: 2). Similar to physicians, theorists or policy makers (like
Anderson) who use the pragmatic model first attempt to diagnose and then provide treatment for
social problems. Shelby rejects this model because while a pragmatic model is a useful way to
treat physical illness, social problems do not have an assumed starting point like the basic
physiology of the human body. Using a pragmatic model, “policymakers . . . treat the
background structure of society as given and focus only on alleviating the burdens of the
disadvantaged” (2016: 2). Shelby argues that this results in a status quo bias, where elements of
the basic structure of society that should be examined are overlooked. With social problems, if
one takes for granted the basic structure of society in order to propose treatment, then one can
become numb to the way in which even these basic structures are socially constructed and
vulnerable to oppressive ideologies. In Anderson’s case, Shelby argues that the pragmatic model
has led her to overlook the ways in which anti-Blackness can and does impact the project of
race-based residential integration because it resides deep in the thought processes and social
interactions of many people in the U.S.
Rejecting the pragmatic model, Shelby employs a “systemic-injustice” framework to the
end that “justice questions. . . be[come] a focal point of public policy, political activism, and
civic discourse concerning the future of our cities and their most disadvantaged inhabitants”
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(2016: 4). By using a systemic-injustice framework, Shelby hopes to avoid the allegedly narrow
point-of-view of the pragmatic model. Instead, Shelby puts his systemic-injustice framework to
use by tracking broad patterns of injustices to better understand localized injustices. In the case
of residential integration, Shelby wants to be careful not to lose sight of the varied ways in which
anti-Blackness is tied to even the basic structures of the U.S., a fact which makes him cautious
about the value of any integrationist project. Using as a starting place the injustices faced by
Black people in the U.S., Shelby motivates his work by asking what is just for this marginalized
population, and what justice can and should demand of them- especially with regards to state
funded/driven projects like residential integration.
According to Shelby, the duty of justice “demands, most fundamentally, that each of us
respect and support just institutions, particularly those that lay claim to our allegiance and from
which we benefit” (2016: 57). The duty of justice is a moral mandate that binds all the citizens of
a state, and Shelby’s view is that under unjust social arrangements, the duty demands that “we
help to establish a just social order and . . . reform unjust institutions” (2016: 57). While the duty
of justice touches all citizens in some way, Shelby argues that it falls with different weight upon
citizens given their capacities to resist injustices.
The first demand of justice would be an immediate “cease and desist” order, so to speak,
for those carrying out acts of injustice. These injustices could be carried out by individuals,
groups, or institutions. Further, the burden of correcting these injustices should fall most heavily
on those who are/were actively carrying out the injustices or primary supporters of the unjust
structures. This isn’t the only group on which the duty of justice imposes requirements. Shelby
also holds that the duty requires affirmative steps to correct for injustices on the part of those
who were bystanders or played more passive roles but still benefitted from unjust (state and
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social) structures and practices. Finally, Shelby believes the duty of justice places demands upon
the oppressed. This is a potentially contentious claim, and Shelby attempts to avoid charges of
victim blaming by arguing that the oppressed “. . . may bear no responsibility for the injustices
they endure. Nevertheless, the oppressed do have some freedom to determine how they will
respond to these conditions- for example, whether they will acquiesce or resist” (2016:
58).Shelby does not want to paint the picture that the oppressed are solely or even mostly
responsible for their life conditions, but does argue that the duty of justice still places important
demands upon them.
Shelby acknowledges that situations arise in which one cannot do much in the way of
reforming or undoing unjust structures and institutions. Even in these cases, Shelby emphasizes
the need for all to refuse to be complicit in unjust practices and institutions whenever possible,
though he admits this can be difficult or impossible given the number of overlapping unjust
structures people must navigate daily. Shelby thinks this resistance can come by way of speaking
out or actions aimed at refusing to silently accept injustices. He writes, “Even if we cannot make
a positive contribution to social reform and cannot entirely avoid some complicity or
compromises with an unjust system, we should at least care about injustice” (2016: 58, emphasis
added). Shelby is here referring to the lightest burden the duty of justice demands- to not be
apathetic when there are injustices and unjust structures/institutions around one. This applies to
all, including the oppressed, and Shelby is clear that the oppressed groups on the receiving end of
society’s injustices have a duty to dissent, where dissent is broadly construed and can happen
through varied means- public protest, communications to community representatives, etc.
I look next to how Shelby applies this duty of justice with regards to residential
integration. We can begin to answer the following questions Shelby poses: why might Black
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people choose to self-segregate in terms of residences (even if they were given a state funded
alternative)? Is this legitimate or is there something objectionable at work in these residential
choices for Black people? What about for whites? Further, does the duty of justice demand
residential integration of Black people into white neighborhoods, given the social-politicalhistorical circumstances of Black people in the U.S.? Shelby argues for an “egalitarian pluralist”
stance which “requires desegregation, social equality, and importantly, economic fairness. It
does not require residential integration. Nor does it oppose it. It does not proscribe voluntary
self-segregation in neighborhoods. Nor does it call for it” (p.67). Let us turn to his argument.

3.2

Black Residential Self-Segregation

Shelby contends that at least some self-segregation by Black people is not only acceptable per
the duties of justice, but also rational. The remainder of this subsection explains his view of why
residential self-segregation by Black people is rational. An important note here is to recognize
that Shelby is discussing the right or reasons of poor Black people to prefer staying in their own
neighborhoods as opposed to accepting state incentivized alternatives- Shelby is not saying these
poor Black people have this residential choice currently.
The most obvious reason that Black people may rationally not choose to integrate into
white neighborhoods is to avoid “interpersonal discrimination, racist treatment, and hostile
attitudes” as well as “interracial conflict, which can, and generally does, reflect the operation of
stereotypes and implicit bias but needn’t be motivated by hostility or animus” (2016: 59). Thus,
Black people in no way have to view whites as intentionally malevolent or vicious in order to
choose to avoid racial conflict with whites.
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Beyond the desire to avoid such conflict, Shelby spells out a number of reasonable
grounds on which Black people might prefer to live in Black neighborhoods (or neighborhoods
with a critical mass of Black people). Shelby is not here trying to say that Black people,
especially those he is writing about, who are in ghettos, have perfectly free residential choices.
What he argues is that even being constrained as these Black persons are by material concerns
and options, group self-segregation can still be a reasonable choice in the context of the U.S.
ghettos. One reason Black people may prefer to self-segregate is to “protect their shared interests
in a society where they are deeply disadvantaged and vulnerable to mistreatment and political
marginalization” (2016: 60). Self-segregation, in the context of racialized threats found across
society and quite possibly exacerbated by residential integration, can be seen as Black people
acting to protect their own basic interests. Due to the historical and contemporary facts about the
U.S., whites do not have this reason: there is no racial symmetry here.
While Black self-segregation can be a response to a hostile social-political climate and
unjust institutions, it does not, for Shelby, have to be an expression of resistance or dissent.
Black people may prefer to live around others who simply share similar life experiences (2016:
61), in neighborhoods whose history is intertwined with their own families, or because these
areas have services, opportunities, and practices that appeal to Black residents. Further, the
points Shelby makes in explaining the potential advantages of self-segregation by Black people
can be extended into a critique of Anderson. If Shelby is accurate in his assessment of positive
reasons Black people may have to live in Black communities, we can question whether Anderson
has an accurate understanding of the social benefits found in bonding ties amongst Black people
in the disadvantaged communities discussed.
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4

INTERROGATING THE PROJECT OF INTEGRATION

In this section, I first examine what I take to be the central objection Shelby has to Anderson’s
arguments for integration. Then I will consider how Anderson might respond, and whether the
potential responses are sufficient as a defense of her position.
Shelby’s disagreement with Anderson is not a dispute over the accuracy of her data
analysis, but importantly turns on “ethical ideals and on how non-ideal theorizing about social
justice should be conceived and practiced.” (Shelby 2016: 67). In this way, Shelby’s criticism of
Anderson has a great deal to do with the framework she utilizes and its potential limitations.
Given the important role social capital plays in Anderson’s argument, Shelby targets her
conceptualization of social capital as an example of how her pragmatic model generates
objectionable dilemmas and attitudes.
The social capital argument also makes integration a particularly
distasteful remedy for ghetto poverty because of its racial dimensions. Such an
approach to corrective justice would reinforce the symbolic power that whites
hold over Black people by encouraging whites to see their relationships with
Black people not as intrinsically valuable form of interracial community but as
avenues for Black people to share in (not abolish) white privilege . . . whites are
free to dole out this dubious privilege to whomever they see fit . . . this puts Black
people in an untenable supplicant position (2016: 70).

This passage from Shelby hits on the most unpleasant and emotionally charged element
of Anderson’s integrationist argument- it seems to ask the oppressed group of poor Black people
to assume many of the risks, costs, and burdens, while guaranteeing little reward since whites are
free to continue living with their privilege if they so choose. Without concrete and substantial
evidence that many whites are willing to tear down the systems that uphold their privileges as
well as work to unlearn their racial prejudices/biases (conscious or not), Shelby does not believe
that justice can demand poor Black people assume the risks associated with residential
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integrationist policies- even in light of the social bonding benefits for Black people that
Anderson argues will be the result of integration..
As was shown in the previous section, if Anderson wishes to avoid being seen as an
assimilationist then she too needs for whites to be ready to enact sweeping social changes in their
interactions with and conceptions of Black people, especially poor Black people. Whether or not,
or to what degree, whites are ready to enact such changes becomes an issue central to Shelby’s
disagreement with Anderson. Further, Shelby sees Anderson as having missed or underestimated
this element of her argument due to her use of the pragmatic model. Anderson identifies an
inequality between Black and white people, but, without consideration of how prevailing strains
of white supremacist thought stain the basic structures of the U.S., she offers a solution that
attempts to treat a symptom while leaving the disease. Her narrow focus, Shelby argues, has led
her to advocate for a position that should be left up to the people who would face the greatest
risk- poor Black people.
As Shelby says, “Black people, as an unjustly disadvantaged group, should be the ones to
decide if forgoing the returns to social capital that integration might provide is worth it to them”
(2016: 75). Shelby’s point is especially powerful given that Anderson is writing as a white
integrationist, which cannot be ignored in light of the myriad of decisions that white people have
made on behalf of Black people in the U.S. and how it’s imposed untold and unwanted financial,
emotional, and psychological costs on Black people as a result. I will further question the merits
of integration in section four where I discuss bell hooks’ experience of past integrationist efforts,
in order to highlight the potential costs of Anderson’s position to Black people as well as to
ground my work in Black voice and life.
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Anderson can potentially rebut Shelby’s critique in several ways. One tactic is to bolster
her arguments with further examination of the basic structures and oppressive ideology (white
supremacy) that have been left largely intact. Broader consideration of racist institutions and
thought patterns may be compatible with Anderson’s pragmatic model of non-ideal theory. For
example, it might be that the empirical data Anderson cites has something to say about prevailing
attitudes among whites, who may be expressing explicitly, or with actions, that they are ready to
relinquish their social privileges. Anderson theorizes that residential integration will work to
enable Black people to share in some of the social benefits that she believes come from living in
close proximity to Whites. However, there is far from conclusive evidence that whites are ready
to go beyond sharing a few basic social privileges and additionally are willing to undertake the
project of interrogating their lives to root out anti-Black sentiment and thought. Thus,
Anderson’s argument becomes messy, as even if on a conscious level many whites do not desire
to extend their social advantages, how can whites dismantle the ideology and structures that
support their privilege regardless of their consent? Studies of unconscious or unintentional racial
bias further cloud the issueiv, and it remains unclear how Anderson could provide adequate
evidence that whites are ready to tackle the broader facets of anti-Blackness that are present in
the U.S.
A second counter argument Anderson could muster is to first concede that Shelby has
both accurately highlighted racially charged dynamics of paternalism embedded in her
arguments and identified how Black people might respond to these elements thus leading to a
rejection of the integrationist position. However, Shelby has not provided evidence that this is
how most (or even many, besides himself) Black people in fact feel about the integrationist
position Anderson advances. Outlaw makes a similar critique in his review of Shelby’s book.v
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Outlaw argues that while Shelby draws inspiration from Kenneth B. Clark’s workvi, he does not
give much space to the voices of those actually in poor, Black, segregated neighborhoods.
Anderson can follow Outlaw in arguing that Shelby is making arguments for poor Black people
in the U.S. instead of with these people. This is a powerful rebuttal that is available to Anderson,
as if it should be up to poor Black people (as Shelby argues) in disadvantaged neighborhoods to
determine their own way forward, they may indeed choose integration.
It is now that I wish to enter into the disagreement between Shelby and Anderson and
reassert a Black voice and experience, that of bell hooks, who has experienced spatial integration
via the school system in the 1960’s. I argue that both Anderson and Shelby can stand to benefit
from greater and grittier interaction with how Black people have, can, and do experience
integration into white spaces.
5

RECONSIDERING THE COSTS OF INTEGRATION

In this section I bring together part of the framework developed by Sara Ahmed with bell
hooks’ account of her experiences during school integration efforts in the 60’s. Ahmed’s work
adds an important dimension to the integration debate by helping us focus on the largely
overlooked fact that space and mobility, which are at the heart of residential integration, are
raced. The current debate glosses over what it is like to move through, into, and around white
spaces as a Black person in the U.S. Using Ahmed’s framework to examine bell hooks’
experiences of integration will reveal under-appreciated potential costs of contemporary
integration efforts, costs that both Shelby and Anderson should take more completely into
account in developing their positions.
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It may seem odd to focus on a single instance of integration; however, in this thesis, I am
only attempting to begin to ground the contemporary integration debate in Black experience. If
this project has merit, it will have to be taken up by others and more fully explored in numerous
conversations and writings. I do not claim that bell hooks’ experience is identical, similar, or
most representative of others’ experiences of integration. I explore bell hooks’ writing as a
starting place, to begin to think about how the integration debate might be served by listening to
those marginalized voices and lives which it is often talking about (instead of with).

5.1

A Phenomenological Framework of Whiteness
Ahmed explains that she “consider[s] what ‘whiteness’ does without assuming whiteness

as an ontological given, but as that which has been received, or become given, over time.
Whiteness could be described as an ongoing and un- finished history, which orientates bodies in
specific directions, affecting how they ‘take up’ space” (2007: 150).vii On this basis, she
illuminates the way in which spaces become ‘white’ and accommodate white bodies/movements.
Accordingly, Ahmed describes whiteness as not only an orientation, but as habitual: “To
describe whiteness as a habit, as second nature, is to suggest that whiteness is what bodies do. . .
If habits are about what bodies do, in ways that are repeated, then they might also shape what
bodies can do.” (2007: 156). White spaces are thus identified by the orientation of bodies as well
as the mobility available to those bodies. One can imagine the entrance of a group of Black
friends into a bar filled mostly with white patrons- there is an immediate re-orientating that
occurs such that the Black bodies obtrude into the white space, and their being noticed shapes
and hinders their ability to move through the space. This will sound familiar, I think, to people of
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color who encounter a multiplicity of such situations in everyday life- at work, in the gym, out to
eat, and everywhere spaces are made white.
Moving further into Ahmed’s phenomenology, whiteness is also understood as being
about the body’s ability to freely lag behind or move unimpeded through spaces: “In other
words, the body is habitual insofar as it ‘trails behind’ in the performing of action, insofar as it
does not pose ‘a problem’ or an obstacle to the action, or is not ‘stressed’ by ‘what’ the action
encounters” (2007: 156). White bodies inhabit spaces through their ability to move and act
without calling attention to themselves, as though the spaces were meant for them- and the
spaces become for them through these bodily habits. “Spaces are orientated ‘around’ whiteness,
insofar as whiteness is not seen. . . The effect of this ‘around whiteness’ . . . makes non-white
bodies feel uncomfortable, exposed, visible, different, when they take up this space” (2007: 157).
Now we can begin to see how the free movement through and shaping of spaces by white bodies
molds the experiences of non-white bodies that encounter these white spaces and bodies.
Ahmed goes on to detail the phenomenological aspect of non-white bodies in white
spaces, which are produced by the orientations of white bodies and their habits. “To be not white
is to be not extended by the spaces you inhabit. This is an uncomfortable feeling . . . The
experience of negation, of being stopped or feeling out of place, or feeling uncomfortable, does
not ‘stop’ there. When the arrival of some bodies is noticed, when an arrival is noticeable, it
generates disorientation” (2007: 163). This is the first experience for non-white bodies in white
spaces: a powerful discomfort produced through disorientation. We can think again of the
experience of Black people entering a predominately white bar- the ensuing stares and
reorienting of white bodies such that those with Black bodies are made to be hyper-aware of their
bodies and their entrance into the white space. The non-extension of Black bodies in white
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spaces is precisely this disorientation manifested as the experiences of sticking out, remaining
apart from, and being hyper-visible in a given space.
Specifically concerning Black bodies in white spaces, Ahmed makes the point that “To
be black in ‘the white world’ is to turn back towards itself, to become an object, which means not
only not being extended by the contours of the world, but being diminished as an effect of the
bodily extensions of others” (2007: 161). It is hard to overestimate the discomfort and restricting
of mobility a person of color can face in white spaces, as the white bodies are rendered invisible,
while non-white bodies are made hyper-visible to the detriment of non-white peoples. It is
through this framework of white bodies, spaces, and their disorientating and uncomfortable
interactions with racially marked bodies that I draw out the cost bell hooks faced when
integrating into a white school.
5.2

The Phenomenal Cost of Desegregation
Bell hooks, in her work Teaching to Transgress (1994)viii, gives personal insight into how

desegregation of schools impacted her and others in her previously segregated Black
communities. Her experiences before integration helped instill the positive radical potential of
schooling in her. She describes her time at an all-Black school in the 50’s and 60’s: “Attending
school then was sheer joy. I loved being a student. I loved learning” (1994: 3). This is the
attitude toward school which many teachers hope to inspire in their students, but which is sadly
short-lived for bell hooks.
Bell hooks’ love and zeal for school would not last, and was changed when she and her
Black peers were forced to attend a newly desegregated (but still, as we will see, distinctly white)
school. “The classroom was no longer a place of pleasure or ecstasy. . . . We were always and
only responding and reacting to white folk” (1994: 4). She underwent a “shift from beloved, all-
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black schools to white schools where black students were always seen as interlopers” (1994: 4).
Later in the text, she reflects further on her experience: “We had to make the journey and thus
bear the responsibility of making desegregation a reality. We had to give up the familiar and
enter a world that seemed cold and strange . . . [W]e had to awaken an hour early so that we
could be bussed to school before the white students arrived. We were made to sit in the
gymnasium and wait” (1994: 24). This is a clear instance of Black bodies being forced into white
spaces. Aside from the cost to the Black students of actually getting to these white spaces (sleep
deprivation, in this case), hooks describes the disorientating experience of entering a new school
where Black bodies did not fit in and were rendered hyper-visible by virtue of their nonwhiteness.
These striking passages illuminate the cost hooks was made to pay, as a child, for
integration efforts. While it may be tempting to dismiss this experience as irrelevant to
contemporary integration efforts (in light of presumed social changes and improved conditions
for Black people in the U.S. since the mid-20th century), Ahmed’s framework resists this
mistaken temptation. What bell hooks describes is eerily similar to the phenomenological
description Ahmed lays out decades later. The Black bodies of hooks and her peers entered the
white spaces (created by white bodies and habits) and were immediately oriented towards the
white spaces- as bell hooks says, they were constantly and only responding to the whiteness
around them. This experience left them disoriented and feeling like unwelcome strangers in
another’s home- a “cold and strange” (1994: 24) experience, as she says. Further, while hooks’
experience of integration is through school desegregation, the common element of Black bodies
being shepherded into white spaces is shared with the residential integration Shelby and
Anderson are concerned about.
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Notice that what has been described is not directly connected to explicitly racist remarks
or policies, which she describes in other places of her work and might be regretfully expected of
Black experiences in the 60’s. The experience of being forced to integrate into these white spaces
posed a cost for Black bodies on its own, aside from other racialized dangers or threats. Bell
hooks was made to feel less than, and diminished by, her inability to extend and move freely
through the new white space.
This forces us to ask if we can really dismiss the fundamental concern that stems from
forcing Black bodies into white spaces created by white bodies. It is dangerous to ignore the
potential costs to Black people that are created if they are to be integrated into white
neighborhoods. Even the best of intentions from the white people already in those spaces would
not negate the fact that they are white spaces, produced by white bodies, and these orientations
and habits are learned through socialization. It is difficult (maybe impossible) to avoid all white
supremacist and anti-Black thoughts and habits if one is socialized in the U.S., and that leads
people to hierarchize bodies such that white ones are at the top and can move freely through
most spaces; non-white and especially Black bodies are placed at the bottom of this hierarchy
and are stopped, disoriented, and often made to feel uncomfortable in these white spaces. As
such, we must consider further how Black bodies are stopped, immobilized, and disoriented in
these spaces before pushing forward with residential integration efforts.
It is this phenomenological aspect of Black interactions with white spaces and the
associated costs of disorientation and discomfort that are lacking from the debate between
Shelby and Anderson. We can now pull out the implications of the phenomenological costs faced
by Black people for both Shelby and Anderson’s positions. It is reasonable to think that more
seriously taking up the matter of lived Black experience would ultimately strengthen Shelby’s
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argument against Anderson, since it has been shown here to reveal previously unconsidered costs
for Black people. However, this is not assured given that this project of phenomenological
grounding is new and could illuminate other facets of the integration debate which have
remained obscured thus far. Any philosophically strong case against Anderson’s integrationist
position would also need to further scrutinize the nature and implications of Black people’s
experiences, so I find this phenomenological grounding equally important for Shelby. The final
verdict on the justifiability of an integrationist policy must await further phenomenological
analysis; however the main point here is that such an analysis is necessary for a sound verdict.
As the debate currently stands, I find Shelby’s argument against the imperative of
integration more convincing than Anderson’s arguments in support of it. As I stated, Shelby has
a need to further make room for the voices and experiences of the poor Black people he is
arguing on behalf of in his work- yet his argument is more respectful of the freedom and equality
of Black people than Anderson’s, in that while he disagrees with there being an imperative for
state driven integration efforts, he has no problem with Black people themselves choosing to
integrate or self-segregate. Anderson has not left much room for Black people to retain a sense of
autonomy. Her argument for integration demands that it be done for the good of Black peopledisregarding their willingness or desire for such change in light of what she believes to be
decisive empirical evidence showing the benefits of residential integration. I am unwilling to
accept that such empirical evidence can be legitimately invoked to override the selfdetermination of marginalized peoples and further side with Shelby in thinking that Anderson’s
narrow framework has left her numb to the massive costs that could be felt by the very
population she is attempting to treat. In the final section, I will articulate two possible objections
to the arguments I have made in this work as well as attempt to respond to them.
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6

OBJECTIONS AND RESPONSES

A project of grounding philosophical debate in experience, which this work is meant to
contribute to, is open to a number of challenges given the way such work cuts against the grain
of contemporary Western academic philosophy- even more so when the project isn’t already up
and running. Here I will lay out and respond only to what I take to be the two most pressing
objections to my project. The first stems from a pragmatic concern aimed at a presumably
unintended implication if my arguments in this thesis have been successful: the hindering or
slowing of any change in the material conditions of the poor, urban, Black communities that
have been at the center of the integration debate. The second charge accuses the project of
painting an overly simplified and essentialist picture of Black experiences in its discussion of
Black spatiality and mobility.
Anderson, it can be argued, saw a dire situation in which people’s life opportunities were
being unjustly molded to a high degree by racialized social conditions- which include residential
segregation. Seeing this led her to look for a point of leverage that could be used to enact
sweeping change of these conditions. She found this point in the potential for residential
integration. Thus, Anderson became aware of injustice and moved to remedy it- or at least
moved to support a remedy through her writings. This thesis, in cautioning Anderson’s
integration project as one which has rushed to action without full appreciation for its
consequences, could be slowing relief to the painful social conditions which Anderson and I are
both concerned with.
I admit that, if my arguments were taken up in a serious manner within the integration
debate, they would not present as simple a pathway toward policy proposals as Anderson’s
arguments for integration do. In this way, one might plausibly say that my arguments would slow
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relief (by means of residential integration) of oppressive social conditions. I admit this is a
possibility, and academic works are frequently dismissed in political arenas because of their
perceived futility insofar as every argument is met with a counter argument and no firm
conclusion is ever established.
However, I strongly suspect that rushing forward with a theoretically and pragmatically
flawed project like residential integration would only result in more pain for the underserved
communities in question. Leaping to action to fix injustice is a tempting move, but we must first
work to uncover how such actions might only further unjust conditions or address surface level
matters while leaving core injustices and the systems which perpetrate them untouched. The
project of this thesis is an attempt to do this uncovering, and so, while it may temporarily slow
change, it can be seen as contributing to a deeper and more holistic approach which will work
against the oppressive institutions at the root of the unjust conditions observed in some poor,
urban, Black neighborhoods.
Anderson, as one of the principal subjects of my critical analysis, might push back
against the response I have given to the above objection. I will consider three points she could
raise in response to the defense I have given of this project. First, Anderson could point to the
empirical evidence that has been and continues to be collected on housing programs that directly
or indirectly contribute to residential integration. After all, it is this evidence which much of her
arguments for integration rest on. While I intentionally left aside any empirical analysis in order
to focus on ethical and moral objections to her arguments, Anderson is under no obligation to
relinquish one of her most persuasive points.
Second, Anderson could argue that my response to the objection above, which
emphasizes the costliness of unintended consequences, appears very similar in structure to the
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counter-arguments which political conservatives have given to any number of proposed
progressive policies. An example is the argument that giving food stamps to those who face food
insecurity or starvation creates a dependence on the government which ultimately harms those
who take advantage of these programs. The harm is thought to be that such a reliance
undermines these people’s motivation and ability to be self-reliant. A more extreme example is
the defense of slavery in the U.S. by arguing that giving freedom to those people who were
slaves would only harm them, since it was thought by many that slaves did have the intellectual
capacities to care for themselves outside of the system of slavery. The point being drawn out
with these examples is that progressive policies have faced resistance in the form of the
argument that unintended consequences would do more harm than good to the very groups which
the policies seek to aid, and that while my project may come from a radically different political
position, it utilizes this same argument structure.
The last point Anderson might make in response to the defense of my project above is
that integrationist policies are (or can be) flexible and responsive to feedback. Residential
integration doesn’t have to ignore the consequences it brings with it- the policies can be altered
or eliminated if they are found to produce significant harms to those people who are impacted by
them. By asserting the potential responsiveness of residential integration policies, Anderson
could acknowledge that my concern over unintended consequences is valid, but doesn’t need to
be seen as a reason for halting the project when it can be improved while simultaneously
continuing.
To respond to the first potential rejoinder by Anderson, I borrow from Shelby. While the
analysis of and implementation of housing policies based on empirical evidence is undeniably
important, it does not for me outweigh the cost of failing to respect the oppressed communities in
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question as people. It is this failure to respect poor Black people as people capable and uniquely
qualified to speak on the project of residential integration which Shelby attributes to Anderson’s
argument; a pitfall which I argued Shelby also partially fell into by not giving space in his work
for these people’s voices. To continue to point back to the empirical data would be to speak past
the work of this project as well as Shelby’s- what I argue is needed is not just further data
analysis, but to uncover the ways in which residential integration can and has failed to respect
the human dignity of the people in question.
The second objection I suggest Anderson might raise is accurate insofar as it does point
out a similarity in the abstract structure of my argument and the ones conservatives have made in
the past. However, this similarity quickly fades away if one returns to the specifics of my
arguments. I would reiterate here Shelby’s critique of Anderson’s work as blind to the way in
which her arguments presuppose the larger structures (formal and informal) of the U.S. That her
arguments take for granted such structures leads her position to actually be more conservative
than I think is immediately obvious. Anderson takes up residential integration in a way that does
little to challenge the insidious and oppressive aspects in the structures that compose the U.S.for example, her project would not directly give the poor Black people in these urban
neighborhoods the power and resources needed to self-determine their existence, something I am
in favor of. Instead, Anderson’s project continues the neoliberal trend of making such decisions
for these people. So while my arguments may in the abstract bear resemblance to conservative
arguments, when they are contextualized alongside Anderson’s position I think it becomes
evident that my arguments are in fact more progressive and radical than her own. Whether these
traits of my arguments work for or against my attempt to convince the reader is of course
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variable, so I will be content here just to have given good reason to understand my position as
importantly dissimilar to conservative arguments of the past.
Finally, my response to the third rebuttal I suggested Anderson could raise is connected
to my response to her first point. If residential integration is, as I’ve argued, a project which fails
to respect poor, urban Black people as people, then the responsiveness or flexibility of any
instantiated project of residential integration is not an overriding factor. I have argued in this
thesis that more space needs to be given to the voices and experiences of the communities who
are at the center of the integration debate, because as it stands the project of residential
integration fails to respect them as fully and equally human. Until such time as the project of
residential integration is being pushed for primarily or at least strongly by the people in these
marginalized communities, then residential integration is not a viable option for correcting the
injustices present. Instead of such support for integration though, what I have seen and read from
people in these communities are more frequently demands for the giving over of resources and
wealth to these communities so that they may attempt to rectify these injustices themselves
without being beholden to outside interests.
The second main objection to my project stems from the impression readers may have
carried away from my discussion of Ahmed’s phenomenology of whiteness framework. The
critical reader might object that this discussion gives the appearance that Black bodies, in their
movements through and interactions with white spaces, have a determined experience of these
spaces. Is this really how it feels to be in white spaces for all Black and brown people?
The answer is of course not- Ahmed and I have both given a simplified description in
order to generate a general framework which can be utilized in a variety of situations. One
should not take the construction of this framework as implicitly containing the assumption that
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all non-white people have identical disorienting experiences of white spaces, or even that all
non-whites are disoriented at all in a given situation. The full diversity of socially relevant
characteristics will shape Black experiences of white spaces, including age, gender, (dis)ability,
and other such perceived features. Every experience contains in it the infinite variability which is
attached to such complex social interactions, and so there cannot be said to be just one
experience of Black bodies in white spaces. Instead, what I borrow from Ahmed is a framework
which articulates a persistent, prominent, and unfortunately common experience for those who
inhabit non-white bodies and must navigate white spaces.
7

CONCLUSIONS

The debate about integration is important and urgent. Both Anderson and Shelby engage
in much-needed discussion about the benefits, costs, and implications of racial integration efforts
in the U.S. More work is needed on the subject, and here I argued that the consideration of Black
people’s lived experience needs to be given more space in discussions of integration. This is
especially true of academic discussions in general and philosophical debates in particular. The
experiences and life opportunities of Black people in poor, urban neighborhoods have been, and
continue to be shaped by unjust and vicious structures and institutions. No matter which side of
the integration debate one falls on, we cannot allow it to erase, minimize, or shut out the voices
of these people. We must find ways to elevate and center even academic debates on the
experiences and words of the Black people who are most impacted by these issues.
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